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Abstract: As trade between China and African countries continues to expand, so
does the debate as regards the developmental outcomes it is likely to produce. This
paper examines the trade relations that have developed between the Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and China since 2000. The
bilateral trade—composed largely of exports of primary goods and imports of
manufactures by the COMESA region—has registered very high rates of growth.
The trade balance has been for the most part in China’s favor. The paper uses a
gravity model of bilateral trade estimated by the Hausman-Taylor method for a
reference sample of countries to project the COMESA-China trade “out of sample.”
Empirical estimates suggest a substantial degree of underutilization of the bilateral
export and import potentials. The main implication is that there are still strong
resistances to the bilateral trade that need to be addressed.
Introduction
It is widely recognized that international trade plays an important role in the process of
economic development. Since the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC) in 2000 in Beijing, the value of goods and services moving between China and the
African continent has witnessed exponential growth. From its initially negligible position, China
has become Africa’s major trade partner. China has also signed bilateral trade agreements with
several African countries (China, 2010), and it has declared that “when conditions are ripe,” it is
willing to negotiate free trade agreement with African countries and African regional organizations
(China, 2006).
Economists have debated about the opportunities and challenges of the Sino-African trade
(e.g., World Bank, 2004; Jenkins & Edwards 2005; Broadman, 2007; Kaplinsky & Morris, 2008).
Much of the existing literature assumes that China and Africa have high unexploited trade
opportunities between them (e.g., Jenkins and Edwards, 2005; Zafar, 2007; Subramanian &
Matthijs 2007). But what is often missing is rigorous analysis. Few studies have tried to predict
the China-Africa trade based on econometric analysis—much less focusing on specific regional
trade blocs in Africa. The existing discourse often takes “Africa” as a whole, which has its own
limitations (Taylor, 2009). While there is scant empirical literature on China’s trade integration
with particular regional economic communities in Africa, it has been recognized that African
regional organizations play an important role in “China’s response to the demands and challenges
it is faced with as an emerging economic and political power in Africa” (Van Hoeymissen, 2011).
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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the trade link and potential between China
and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).11 China is now the
world’s second largest economy (after the United States) with about one-fifth of the world
population. COMESA is one of the largest and most vibrant regional economic
communities in Africa (Alemayehu & Haile, 2008). The regional bloc attained a Free Trade
Area (FTA) in 2000, and it is now moving toward a Customs Union (COMESA, 2013).
With a combined population of 460 million, a combined GDP of US$540 billion and rich
endowment of natural resources, COMESA can play a major role in conditioning China’s
trade integration with Africa with significant developmental consequence.12 Indeed, China
appointed representatives to COMESA (Van Hoeymissen, 2011), while COMESA as a
regional bloc has been seeking to establish trade agreements with China. The COMESA
Secretariat said in a statement: “COMESA has named China as a new lucrative destination
for its expansion programs in enhancing trade and attracting investment.”13
In this paper, merchandise trade between COMESA and China is analyzed and the
bilateral trade potential is econometrically estimated using a dataset for the period 2000–
2011. Estimation of the trade potential is based on McPherson and Trumbull (2008), where
a gravity model of bilateral trade will be estimated by a Hausman and Taylor (1981) method
for “out-of-sample” trade projection. The paper finds strong evidence for future COMESAChina trade prospects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a brief analysis of
trade patterns between COMESA and China in the recent past. Section III discusses the
literature on gravity models of bilateral trade and their econometric estimation. Section IV
empirically investigates the trade potential between COMESA countries and China.
Section V concludes.
The Patterns of COMESA-China Trade
Trade between COMESA and China has accelerated in recent years. This is perhaps due to
trade reforms in both regions (Zafar, 2007). Between 2000 and 2011, merchandise exports from
COMESA to China increased from close to US$894 million to US$16 billion, averaging an annual
growth rate of more than 480% (Table 1). If one excluded the extremely outlying growth rates for
Burundi, Seychelles and Swaziland, COMESA exports to China would still grow on average by
more than 145% per annum. Meanwhile, Table 2 shows that COMESA imported US$1.5 billion

11

COMESA is a membership of 19 countries: Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda,
Zambia and Zimbabwe. It was established by a Treaty signed in November 1993 in Kampala, Uganda and ratified in
December 1994 in Lilongwe, Malawi. It was formed to replace the former Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and
Southern Africa (PTA) which had existed since 1981(see http://www.comesa.int).
12
Of the total value of Chinese-African merchandise trade in 2012, COMESA accounted for over 27%.
13
“COMESA Seeks Partnership with China.” 2005. People’s Daily Online, April 28.
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200504/28/eng20050428_182973.html (accessed November 27, 2012).
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in merchandise from China in 2000. The import figure rose to US$17.2 billion in 2011, at a rate
of 39.7% per annum.
Table 1. COMESA’s Merchandise Exports to China, 2000–2011
Values
(US$ Thousand)

Burundi
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Djibouti
Egypt
Eritrea
Ethiopia

Average Growth Rates
(%)

2000

2005

2011

2000–11

742

123

2,812

1930.1

4

0.4

1

91.0

664

276,222

3,016,477

172.3

10

195

142

319.6

39,148

109,272

968,517

76.9

38

251

936

362.9

935

90,444

283,443

120.0

Kenya

3,424

17,040

61,564

31.8

Libya

23,472

810,676

1,816,524

406.3

5,918

21,131

91,049

34.0

Madagascar
Malawi

132

2,368

55,056

413.3

Mauritius

1,156

6,323

6,397

51.4

Rwanda

1,488

12,317

56,390

53.8

88

7

421

1107.9

Seychelles
Sudan

673,688

2,680,168

6,012,749

28.3

Swaziland

148

24,945

839

3784.8

Uganda

661

15,959

41,207

76.1

Zambia
Zimbabwe

41,425
100,716

117,095
131,313

2,926,234
562,891

63.8
29.2

All COMESA

893,858

4,315,850

15,903,648

481.8

Source: UNCTAD (2013).
Note. The average growth rate for Comoros’ exports to China does not include the period 2002–2005 due to
missing data.

COMESA and China have become increasingly important in each other’s trade profiles,
but not to the same degree (Table 4). While there has been a marked shift in COMESA’s trade
toward China and China has become COMESA’s second largest trade partner—only behind the
European Union (EU), trade with COMESA still comprises a very small proportion of China’s
total trade. The share of China in COMESA’s total exports has more than quintupled, from 3.1%
to 16.1% during 2000–2011, while the share of COMESA in China’s overall exports only rose
from 0.6% to 0.9%. In the same period, the share of China in COMESA’s total imports grew from
4.1% to 10.6%, whereas the share of COMESA in China’s world imports increased from 0.5% to
1.2%.
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Table 2. COMESA’s Merchandise Imports from China, 2000–11
Values
(US$ Thousand)

Average Growth Rates
(%)

2000

2005

2011

2000–11

5,663

12,150

63,472

33.0

249

1,651

13,232

53.7

Congo, Dem. Rep.

19,598

82,631

882,496

45.8

Djibouti

24,896

24,964

97,908

18.1

640,388

914,544

6,320,561

29.8

3,365

13,684

246,081

92.6

Burundi
Comoros

Egypt
Eritrea
Ethiopia

96,673

516,952

1,718,111

34.3

Kenya

113,894

413,371

1,859,098

30.7

Libya

52,399

251,301

768,991

31.1

Madagascar

88,667

234,454

540,631

44.6

Malawi

8,664

28,762

206,374

37.3

157,558

310,247

625,899

14.6

Rwanda

4,245

15,673

108,528

45.0

Seychelles

3,778

6,890

12,428

16.3

154,956

1,447,890

1,994,640

32.6

3,231

35,511

178,303

73.5

Uganda

39,782

108,800

513,555

33.7

Zambia
Zimbabwe

19,049
35,370

83,131
112,408

703,038
383,034

51.0
36.0

1,472,425

4,615,014

17,236,381

39.7

Mauritius

Sudan
Swaziland

All COMESA

Source: UNCTAD (2013).
Note. The figures on Sudan’s imports from China in 2010–2011 are based on China’s export data.

The significance of trade with China (in terms of value) also varies widely between
individual COMESA member states (Table 5). On the export side, China’s share in the value of
total merchandise exports reaches as high as 56% in Sudan, 46% in Democratic Republic of the
Congo and 33% in Zambia, whereas the corresponding share is less than 1% in Comoros, Djibouti,
Eritrea, Mauritius, Seychelles and Swaziland. But the Chinese share in total exports has increased
in almost all COMESA countries over the 2000–2011 period, with Comoros, Djibouti and Eritrea
being the only exceptions. On the import side, China makes up between 15–30% of the value of
total merchandise imports in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Madagascar and Sudan; the corresponding share is found to be less than 5% in Comoros and
Seychelles.
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Table 3. Country Distribution of COMESA’s Trade with China (%)
COMESA Exports
to China
Burundi
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Djibouti
Egypt

COMESA Imports
from China

0.01

0.3

0.00001

0.1

15.1

3.8

0.001

0.6

5.7

34.7

0.005

0.8

Ethiopia

1.8

13.5

Kenya

0.3

10.7

Libya

Eritrea

18.5

6.2

Madagascar

0.5

3.3

Malawi

0.2

1.1

0.05

3.9

Mauritius
Rwanda
Seychelles
Sudan
Swaziland
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

0.2

0.6

0.001

0.1

41.6

12.3

0.1

0.5

0.3

3.0

13.2
2.4

2.6
1.9

Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of UNCTAD (2013).
Note. Figures are based on 2009–2011 average trade values.

Table 4. COMESA and China: Mutual Importance in Merchandise Trade
COMESA exports to China as % of

2000

2005

2011

3.1

6.6

16.1

0.6

0.7

0.9

4.1

7.5

10.6

0.5

0.7

1.2

COMESA world exports
China exports to COMESA as % of
China world exports
COMESA imports from China as %
of COMESA world imports
China imports from COMESA as %
of China world imports

Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of UNCTAD (2013).
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Table 5. Share of China in Merchandise Exports and Imports of COMESA Countries (%)
2000

2011

Exports

Imports

Exports

Imports

Burundi

1.5

3.8

2.3

8.4

Comoros

0.03

0.6

0.01

4.8

Congo, Dem. Rep.

0.1

2.8

45.7

16.0

0.03

12.0

0.2

19.2

Egypt

0.8

4.6

3.1

10.1

Eritrea

0.2

0.7

0.2

29.4

Ethiopia

0.2

7.7

10.8

19.3

Kenya

0.2

3.9

1.1

12.6

Libya

0.2

1.4

10.1

9.6

Madagascar

0.7

9.0

6.2

18.3

Djibouti

Malawi

0.03

1.6

3.9

8.5

Mauritius

0.1

7.6

0.2

12.1

Rwanda

2.9

2.0

13.5

6.1

Seychelles

0.05

1.1

0.1

1.8

Sudan

41.3

10.0

56.4

21.6

Swaziland

0.02

0.3

0.04

9.1

Uganda

0.1

2.6

1.9

9.1

Zambia
Zimbabwe

4.6
5.2

2.1
1.9

32.5
16.0

9.8
8.7

Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of UNCTAD (2013).

Regarding bilateral trade balance, it has been usually in deficit for COMESA. This is born
out by Figure 1. There was a bilateral trade deficit of about US$579 million for COMESA as a
bloc in 2000. It then narrowed to US$299 million in 2005, and it was even replaced by trade
surpluses during 2006–2007 due to a higher growth of exports to China over imports from China.
COMESA’s bilateral trade balance subsequently worsened to show deficits during 2008–2009 in
the face of a sharp drop in exports growth before it registered a trade surplus in 2010 as exports
increased dramatically. But the trade balance turned deficit for COMESA once again in 2011
owing mainly to a high rise in imports and the deficit peaked at US$1.3 billion for the period.
COMESA’s exports of petroleum and related products (mainly from Sudan and Libya) exert a
significant influence on the balance of trade with China. It can be seen from Figure 1 that without
these commodities, the trade deficits for COMESA would be continuous and even higher.
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Figure 1. COMESA’s Trade Balance with China

2005
Year

2000
Trade balance

2010

Trade balance excl. petroleum products

Source: UNCTAD (2013).
Note. Trade balance is obtained as COMESA’s merchandise exports to China minus COMESA’s
merchandise imports from China.

This trade imbalance can be explained by, among other things, the structure of the twoway trade. COMESA exports to China lack diversification and are heavily concentrated in primary
commodities with limited value addition (Figure 2). They are particularly driven by petroleum and
related products, which account for 60% of the value of total COMESA exports to China. The next
important export commodities are ores and metals (31%). By contrast, COMESA imports from
China are largely comprised of manufactures. Machinery and transport equipment account for 43%
of the value of total COMESA imports from China, followed by miscellaneous manufactured
articles such as articles of apparel, clothing accessories, footwear and furniture (16%), textile yarn
and related products (11%), and chemical products (8%). Other manufactured goods together
constitute 18% of COMESA imports from China.
The above structure of COMESA-China trade is consistent with Zafar’s (2007) argument
that trade between Africa and China closely follows “what would be expected from comparative
advantage and the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model,” with Africa exporting primary
commodities and China exporting manufactures. However, there are concerns (e.g., Kaplinsky &
Morris, 2008) that such trade pattern could narrow the space for industrial development and
economic diversification of a regional grouping like COMESA.
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Figure 2. Product Composition of COMESA’s Trade with China
COMESA Exports to China

Manufactured
goods
Food items
3%
4%

Agricultural
raw materials
2%

Ores and
metals
31%

Petroleum and
related
products
60%

COMESA Imports from China
Chemical
products
8%
Other
manufactured
goods
18%

Textile yarn
and related
products
11%

Primary
commodities
4%
Machinery
and transport
equipment
43%

Miscellaneous
manufactured
articles
16%

Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of UNCTAD (2013).
Note: Figures are based on 2009–11 average trade values.

Gravity Model and Econometric Issues
Gravity Model
The gravity model of bilateral trade has been extensively applied in the empirical literature
on international economics since its first introduction by Tinbergen (1962). One of its most popular
applications has been simulation of bilateral trade potentials (Baldwin, 1994; Brenton & Di Mauro
1998; Chionis & Liargovas 2002). In the traditional concept of gravity model, bilateral trade can
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be explained by national incomes and both trade impediment and preference factors (Egger, 2002).
As in Deardorff (1995), the simple version of gravity model can be specified as
𝑇𝑖𝑗 = 𝐴

𝑌𝑖 𝑌𝑗
,
𝐷𝑖𝑗

(1)

where 𝑇𝑖𝑗 is the value of exports from country i to country j, the 𝑌’s are national incomes of the
two countries, 𝐷𝑖𝑗 is geographical distance between them, and 𝐴 is a constant of proportionality.
Bilateral trade is thus directly related to national income and inversely related to geographical
distance.
Notwithstanding gravity model’s consistent empirical success (Bergstrand, 1985), the
model was initially criticized for lack of strong theoretical foundations. Anderson (1979), however,
settled this criticism when he derived the model from constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
preferences and goods that are differentiated by region of origin. The gravity model has since been
derived from different trade theories, including Ricardian, Heckscher-Ohlin and increasing returns
to scale theories (Evenett & Keller, 2002).
Another major criticism has been specifically related to the projection of bilateral trade
potentials. Some studies used “in-sample” trade projection, meaning that they estimate the gravity
equation on a sample including the countries of interest and then define trade potential by the
residuals of the estimated equation (Baldwin, 1994). The in-sample approach is, however, severely
criticized by Egger (2002), who argues that systematic variations in residuals reflect
misspecification of the econometric model rather than trade potential. The alternative approach is
to use “out-of-sample” trade projection (Chionis & Liargovas 2002). The out-of-sample approach
excludes the countries of interest from the sample while estimating the gravity equation and then
applies the parameter estimates derived by the reference sample to the countries of interest in order
to predict their “natural” trade flows. The difference between the actual and the predicted trade
flows is then interpreted as unrealized trade potential. This approach is most appropriate when the
countries of interest are in the early stage of transformation (Egger, 2002). In this study, the outof-sample technique is used to estimate the trade potential between COMESA countries and China
by excluding the former from the estimated equation.
Econometric Issues
Major concerns have been raised on the choice of econometric estimation techniques in
empirical gravity models. For instance, Mátyás (1997) criticizes cross-section approaches and
argues that the correct econometric specification of the gravity model is a triple-indexed model
with exporter, importer and time effects. This means that conclusions on trade potentials based on
ordinary least squares (OLS) technique are problematic (Egger, 2002). But the gravity literature
has been less clear as to how to treat country-specific effects. Egger (2000) advocates a fixed
effects model on the basis of a Hausman (1978) specification test and an intuitive argument that
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country effects are widely predetermined. Mátyás (1998), on the other hand, argues that for some
datasets, it may be more appropriate to formalize these effects as random variables, which leads to
a random effects model.
Both fixed effects and random effects approaches have limitations, however. The fixed
effects approach has two shortcomings. First, it eliminates from the model observed time-invariant
characteristics (such as distance), all of which are simply absorbed into the fixed effects (Greene,
2003). Second, it cannot be used for out-of-sample trade prediction unless one makes ad hoc
assumptions to decompose the fixed effects into a component that is common across the trade
partners and one that is specific to the partner (McPherson & Trumbull, 2008). The random effects
treatment does allow the model to include time-invariant variables. But the main drawback of the
random effects approach is that it assumes, with little justification, that the random effects are
uncorrelated with the regressors. If the correlation exists, then the resulting estimator is
inconsistent (Greene, 2003).
For the purpose of the present paper, McPherson and Trumbull’s suggestion is followed,
which is to apply the Hausman and Taylor (1981) estimator of panel data. Hausman-Taylor
estimator is an instrumental variables estimator of the random effects model that uses only the
information within the model (Greene, 2003). It is appealing for two reasons. First, it allows for
the inclusion of time-invariant variables and generates out-of-sample trade forecasts without the
need to make any ad hoc assumptions required by the fixed effects estimator. Second, it removes
the correlation between the random effects and the regressors, which is the cause of the rejection
of standard random effects estimator. Thus, time-invariant variables can be consistently estimated
without compromising the estimates for time-varying variables (McPherson & Trumbull, 2008).
Other econometric estimation choices that matter for results obtained from the gravity
equation include choice of dependent variable, measure of variables (Baldwin & Taglioni, 2006),
functional form (Sanso, Cuairan, & Sanz 1993; Coe, Subramanian, & Tamirisa, 2007) and
treatment of zero trade observations (Baldwin 1994; Brülhart & Kelly, 1999).
Empirical Evidence of COMESA-China Trade Potential
Empirical Model
The empirical model employed in this study is the gravity model of McPherson and
Trumbull (2008). The general specification of the model follows the econometric specification of
the Hausman and Taylor (1981) estimator:
′
′
′
′
𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋1𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝛽1 + 𝑋2𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝛽2 + 𝑍1𝑖𝑗
𝛿1 + 𝑍2𝑖𝑗
𝛿2 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ,

(2)

where 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is defined as the value of imports of country i from country j in year t, 𝑋1 are variables
that are time-varying and uncorrelated with 𝜇𝑖𝑗 , 𝑋2 are variables that are time-varying and
correlated with 𝜇𝑖𝑗 , 𝑍1 are variables that are time-invariant and uncorrelated with 𝜇𝑖𝑗 , and 𝑍2 are
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variables that are time-invariant and correlated with 𝜇𝑖𝑗 . 𝛼 is a constant term, and 𝛽1 , 𝛽2, 𝛿1 and
𝛿2 are vectors of slope parameters. (𝜇𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ) is a compound disturbance, where 𝜇𝑖𝑗 is country
pair-specific unobserved random effect that does not vary over time and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is an error component
that varies in both the country pair and time dimensions.
As pointed out by Greene (2003), it is the likely presence of 𝑋2 and 𝑍2 that complicates
estimation of the random effects model. The Hausman-Taylor strategy is to estimate equation (2)
by instrumental variables technique. There is no need to use external instruments. First, 𝑋1 and 𝑋2
are transformed into their deviations from group means, as in fixed effects estimation. The group
mean deviations can then be used as instrumental variables. Second, because 𝑍1 is exogenous by
definition, it can also serve as a group of instrumental variables. Finally, the group means of 𝑋1
can serve as instruments for 𝑍2 , and the model will be identified so long as the number of variables
in 𝑋1 is at least as large as the number of variables in 𝑍2 .
Following McPherson and Trumbull, 𝑋1 contains per capita GDPs (𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 and 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 ),
populations (𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 and 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗𝑡 ) and the absolute value of the difference in index of economic
freedom (𝐷𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 ) of the trade partners i and j. For 𝑋2, the model includes the index of economic
freedom of each partner (𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 and 𝐹𝑅𝑗𝑡 ) and the absolute value of the difference in GDP per capita
of the partners (𝐷𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 ). It is argued that levels of economic freedom and difference in GDP
per capita are likely to be correlated with other governmental, institutional, geographical or social
characteristics not explicitly included in the model and captured by 𝜇𝑖𝑗 . 𝑍1 comprises geographical
distance between trade partners (𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗 ) and dummy variables for both partners with common
land border (𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑗 ), common language (𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗 ) and regional trade agreement (𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 ). For 𝑍2 ,
the model has dummies for both trade partners with a communist past (𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑗 ) and both having a
non-communist past (𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑗 ). There is a potential for having a communist or non-communist
past to be correlated with characteristics related to trade barriers, competitive markets or
longstanding relationships that are included in 𝜇𝑖𝑗 (McPherson and Trumbull 2008). Hence, the
estimated gravity equation may be written in log-linear form as
ln 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽11 ln 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12 ln 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽13 ln 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14 ln 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽15 ln 𝐷𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽21 ln 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽22 ln 𝐹𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽23 ln 𝐷𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛿11 ln 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿12 𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿13 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿14 𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿21 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛿22 𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡

(3)

Typically, a positive sign is expected for 𝛽11 , 𝛽12 , 𝛿12 , 𝛿13 , 𝛿14 and 𝛿22 . Importer’s per
capita GDP as a measure of income and exporter’s per capita GDP as a measure of the variety of
output are expected to have a positive impact on bilateral trade (Baldwin, 1994). Dummies for
common land border and language are used to capture information costs. Countries with common
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language and border tend to trade more with each other due to lower information (search) costs
resulting from better knowledge of each other’s “business practices, competitiveness and delivery
reliability” (Piermartini & Teh, 2005). Regional trade agreements are intended to reduce tariffs
and other barriers to trade between countries. Hence, they are likely to have a positive effect on
trade among members (Frankel, Stein & Wei, 1995). Communist countries, McPherson and
Trumbull argue, are historically associated with closed economies that are less open to trade. Thus,
trade is also likely to be higher between countries that do not have a communist past.
The coefficients of 𝛽15, 𝛽21, 𝛽22, 𝛽23, 𝛿11 and 𝛿21 , on the other hand, are expected to have
a negative sign. The absolute value of the difference in per capita GDP between countries measures
economic distance (McPherson & Trumbull, 2008). This variable has an expected negative sign
because according to the Linder hypothesis, countries with similar levels of income per capita will
exhibit similar tastes, produce similar but differentiated products and trade more among
themselves (Roberts, 2004). High levels of economic freedom signify low levels of government,
social, or political barriers to trade. The index of economic freedom is such that a higher value
indicates less freedom, and therefore a negative sign is expected (McPherson & Trumbull, 2008).
Following the spirit of the Linder hypothesis, the closer two countries are in terms of their
economic freedom levels, the more likely they are to trade. The greater the distance between two
trade partners, the higher the transportation costs and hence the less the two-way trade (Bergstrand,
1985). Countries with a communist past tend to trade less and thus a negative coefficient is
assigned for this dummy variable.
As for the coefficients of population, they are theoretically ambiguous. The population
coefficient of the exporting country (𝛽14) may be negatively or positively signed, depending on
whether the country exports less when it is big (absorption effect) or whether a big country exports
more than a small country (economies of scale). For similar reasons, the population coefficient of
the importing country (𝛽13) may also assume a positive or negative sign (Martinez-Zarzoso &
Nowak-Lehmann, 2003).
In line with the out-of-sample technique of trade projection, the above gravity coefficients
are estimated using trade flows between a reference sample of countries that exclude the COMESA
region. Then the coefficient estimates derived by the reference sample are applied to COMESAChina data to predict their potential or “natural” trade flows. This calculation can be done as
follows (McPherson & Trumbull, 2008):
′ ̂
′ ̂
̂𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼̂ + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑀
𝛽 + 𝑍𝑖𝑗
𝛿,

(4)

̂ denotes the predicted value of 𝑀. 𝛼̂, 𝛽̂ and 𝛿̂ refer to the coefficient estimates. 𝑋 and 𝑍
where 𝑀
̂ is to
stand for the time-varying and time-invariant variables, respectively. In the final analysis, 𝑀
be compared with 𝑀 to assess the magnitude of unrealized trade potential.
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The Data
The dataset contains annual data for 43 selected countries covering the period 2000–11.
The countries encompass developed as well as developing economies of the world, which are
assumed to be well integrated into the international market. 14 The dependent variable is bilateral
merchandise imports in thousands of current US dollars sourced from UNCTAD (2013).
Therefore, the potential number of total observations is 21,672 (= 43 × 42 × 12) for the twelveyear period. The dependent variable takes on a zero value for only 45 observations (due to missing
trade flows), which ensures 21,627 observations in the regression model. Data on GDP per capita
in current US dollars and population are drawn from World Bank (2013). Indices of economic
freedom are obtained from the Heritage Foundation (2013). Each of these indices has ten
components of economic freedom, ranging from property rights to financial freedom. Bilateral
distances are derived from CEPII (2012). The distances refer to great-circle distances in kilometers
between the capital cities of trade partners.
Border and language dummy variables are compiled from CEPII (2012). The border
dummy takes the value 1 for a pair of countries (i, j) with a common land border, and 0 otherwise.
The language dummy has the value 1 if both countries have a common official language, and 0
otherwise. The dummy variable for regional trade agreement is created using information obtained
from WTO (2013). The regional trade agreements include free trade agreements and customs
unions. This dummy has the value 1 for a pair of countries with membership in the same regional
trade agreement, and 0 otherwise. Finally, data on dummy variables for a communist and noncommunist past come from Information Please (2013). One of the dummy variables (𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑗 ) has
the value 1 if trading countries i and j both have a communist past; 0 otherwise. The other dummy
(𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑗 ) equals 1 if both countries have a non-communist past; 0 otherwise.
The Results
The estimates for OLS, fixed effects, random effects and Hausman-Taylor estimators of
equation (3) are reported in Table 6. They are obtained by STATA Version 12 software package.
The F test statistic is 161.36 and is significant at the 1% level. This indicates the presence of
unobserved bilateral effects and hence inappropriateness of the OLS technique. The Hausman
(1978) test based on the difference between the fixed effects and random effects estimators gives
an observed chi-squared value of 1482.81. This is significant at the 1% level and reveals that the
random effects model suffers from correlation between the explanatory variables and the bilateral
effects. This suggests the fixed estimater is better choice. But, as already noted, the effects of all
time-invariant variables are eliminated in a fixed effects approach.

14

For list of the countries used in reference sample, see Appendix, Table A1.
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Table 6. Gravity Model Estimates for the Reference Sample (Dependent Variable: Natural Logarithm of Bilateral Imports)
OLS

Random Effects

–46.631*** (0.513)

–15.852*** (0.615)

Importer per capita GDP

0.670*** (0.010)

0.730*** (0.011)

0.855*** (0.014)

0.817*** (0.013)

0.854*** (0.014)

Exporter per capita GDP

0.661*** (0.010)

0.517*** (0.011)

0.528*** (0.014)

0.500*** (0.013)

0.529*** (0.014)

–0.025*** (0.006)

–0.026*** (0.005)

–0.020*** (0.005)

–0.020*** (0.005)

–0.020*** (0.005)

0.918*** (0.006)

0.784*** (0.018)

0.548*** (0.103)

0.565*** (0.071)

0.474*** (0.099)

Constant

Difference in per capita GDP
Importer population

Fixed Effects

HT I

—

HT II

4.109

(4.784)

–15.355

(17.692)

0.970*** (0.006)

0.726*** (0.018)

–0.977*** (0.103)

–0.140** (0.071)

–0.902*** (0.099)

–0.881*** (0.011)

–0.872*** (0.034)

—

–0.635*** (0.233)

6.258*** (1.839)

Importer freedom index

2.502*** (0.083)

–0.253*** (0.064)

–0.436*** (0.065)

–0.453*** (0.063)

–0.444*** (0.065)

Exporter freedom index

2.823*** (0.083)

–0.041

(0.064)

–0.447*** (0.065)

–0.366*** (0.063)

–0.438*** (0.065)

Difference in freedom index

0.023** (0.010)

–0.022*** (0.007)

–0.029*** (0.007)

–0.031*** (0.006)

–0.029*** (0.007)

Common border

0.526*** (0.041)

0.556*** (0.136)

—

1.911

(1.659)

Common language

0.458*** (0.027)

0.767*** (0.088)

—

0.930

(0.654)

14.020*** (3.995)

Regional trade agreement

0.134*** (0.019)

–0.065

(0.061)

—

–0.264

(0.369)

6.408*** (2.119)

Both communist

0.635*** (0.060)

0.295

(0.199)

—

–13.963

(28.436)

46.616 (100.174)

Both non-communist

0.134*** (0.019)

0.427*** (0.060)

—

–1.763

(4.487)

–43.447** (19.049)

Exporter population
Distance

Number of observations
Number of groups
R-squared
Bilateral effects: F(1803, 19815)
Hausman specification test: χ2(8)

21627

21627

21627

21627

21627

—

1804

1804

1804

1804

0.771

0.726

0.577

—

—

—
—

—
1482.81***

161.36***
—

—
148.90***

—
8.49

Notes: 1. All explanatory variables except dummies are expressed in natural logarithms.
2. Standard errors are in parentheses.
3. OLS standard errors are not adjusted for the variance components.
4. Estimates in HT I column are Hausman-Taylor estimates according to McPherson and Trumbull (2008).
5. Estimates in HT II column are Hausman-Taylor estimates with endogenous importer and exporter per capita GDPs,
holding everything else the same as in McPherson and Trumbull.
*** and ** denote level of statistical significance at 1% and 5%, respectively.
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(5.847)

The Hausman-Taylor estimates of the gravity equation are presented in the final two columns
of Table 6. The HT I column refers to the specification of McPherson and Trumbull with their
choice of exogenous and endogenous variables as in equation (3). The time-varying parameter
estimates are generally close to their fixed effects counterparts. They also have the expected signs,
except for regional trade agreement and common non-communist past. However, the effects of all
time-invariant variables, except for bilateral distance, are not estimated significantly. Furthermore,
the Hausman test based on the difference between the fixed effects and HT I estimators produces
a chi-squared value of 148.90, which is significant at the 1% level. This means that the hypothesis
that the results of HT I are generated from valid set of instruments is rejected.
To correct this problem in the original model, the results are checked for sensitivity to
alternative choices of the exogenous time-varying variables (Baltagi & Khanti-Akom, 1990). The
HT II column of Table 6 presents the results for a model where the importer and exporter per capita
GDPs (𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 and 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 ) are treated as endogenous (correlated with 𝜇𝑖𝑗 ), keeping everything
else the same as in McPherson and Trumbull (2008). The Hausman test for this specification yields
a highly insignificant chi-squared value of 8.49, so the legitimacy of the instrument set is not
rejected. Nearly all the estimated parameters of the time-varying variables have moved even closer
to the fixed effects parameters. This confirms that it has been possible to separate the effects of
time-invariant variables using the Hausman-Taylor estimator without compromising the parameter
estimates of the time-varying variables (McPherson & Trumbull, 2008). HT II, therefore, is the
preferred model in this study.
Most coefficient estimates of HT II have the expected sign and statistically significant effect
on bilateral trade. It has been possible to successfully estimate the effect of common language and
regional trade agreement—time-invariant variables that would be dropped in the fixed effects
estimation. As in McPherson and Trumbull’s study, common border turns out to have an
insignificant effect on trade and, contrary to expectations, the distance variable has a positive effect
but here it is also statistically significant. Likewise, the effects of common communist and noncommunist past have the wrong sign but only the latter is statistically significant at the 5% level.
As a next step, the HT II coefficient estimates are used to predict COMESA countries’
“natural” trade values with China, according to equation (4). For the sake of convenience in
interpreting trade potential, average ratios of actual to predicted trade values are calculated for the
period 2009–2011. A ratio of less than one indicates unutilized trade potential. Table 7 reports the
results. It appears that all COMESA countries are trading with China far below their potential. The
average ratios of actual to predicted trade are found to be less than one half. In fact, in all but one
of the cases, actual imports and exports fall more than 60 percentage points under their “natural”
levels (a ratio of less than 0.40). This may not be surprising given that China and COMESA
countries have strengthened their bilateral trade ties only recently. The results also confirm
expectations of other authors (Jenkins & Edwards, 2005).

International Journal of African Development v.1 n.2 Spring 2014

43

Despite some striking similarities, Table 7 shows that the export ratios are generally lower
than the import ratios. In other words, COMESA’s exports to China have performed worse than
its imports have. It seems that China has targeted the COMESA market more aggressively than
COMESA has targeted the Chinese market. Within the COMESA region, the ratios of actual to
expected exports to China are particularly low for small countries such as Comoros, Eritrea and
Seychelles, while they are relatively higher for Sudan and Libya (both predominantly oil
exporters), as well as Egypt and Zambia. As far as imports from China are concerned, Egypt is the
highest performer in the regional grouping with actual values of more than 40% of the expected
amount, while Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea and Ethiopia are the lowest performers
with 14–17%. In sum, though, these results offer robust indication for bright prospects for
COMESA-China trade.
Table 7. Ratio of COMESA Countries’ Actual to Predicted Trade with China
Imports

Exports

Burundi

0.30

0.18

Comoros

0.26

0.05

Congo, Dem. Rep.

0.16

0.16

Djibouti

0.32

0.12

Egypt

0.41

0.33

Eritrea

0.14

0.07

Ethiopia

0.17

0.14

Kenya

0.38

0.25

Libya

0.36

0.33

Madagascar

0.35

0.26

Malawi

0.32

0.23

Mauritius

0.35

0.19

Rwanda

0.31

0.24

Seychelles

0.26

0.08

Sudan

0.38

0.37

Swaziland

0.28

0.16

Uganda

0.35

0.24

Zambia
Zimbabwe

0.33
0.33

0.32
0.28

Note: Trade ratios are calculated based on average data for 2009–2011.
Two implications can be drawn from the above results. First, there appear to be significant
trade impediments between COMESA and China. The two-way trade is likely to continue to
expand with more trade-enhancing policy measures on both sides. The measures might be toward
reducing bilateral trade barriers as well as developing COMESA’s exporting capabilities. Second,
COMESA and China need to anticipate the developmental impacts from future expansion of the
bilateral trade. The impacts may be far-reaching, inasmuch as the bilateral trade potential is
enormous.
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Conclusion
This paper investigates the trade patterns and potential between COMESA and China. The
empirical analysis shows that the bilateral trade has seen a high growth rate in the 2000s, and that
COMESA exports to China are largely driven by primary products (particularly oil) while the
imports are manufactures in the main. The natural resource-rich economies of Sudan, Libya,
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia account for the lion’s share of COMESA’s exports
to China. Two other imbalances in COMESA’s current trade integration with China are worth
noting. First, whereas China has become a major trade partner of COMESA (although the
significance varies widely between individual COMESA member states), the share of COMESA
in China’s overall trade profile remains small by comparison. Second, the bilateral trade balance
in the review period was often in China’s favor, which is partly a reflection of the nature of
products moving between the two regions.
The paper obtains indicative estimates of the potential to increase the COMESA-China
trade based on the gravity model of McPherson and Trumbull (2008). The model fits the data
reasonably well. Comparing actual and estimated “natural” trade flows indicates that the
COMESA countries and China are trading much lower than their potential suggests, falling by
more than 60 percentage points.
These findings carry policy implications for COMESA-China trade. First, there is a clear
need for COMESA to diversify its export pattern—product-wise and country-wise—in order to
better exploit the Chinese market as well as balance the bilateral trade in the longer run. With a
single commodity and only four member countries dominating COMESA’s exports to China, there
is considerable room for improvement in exporting capabilities.
Second, significant trade restrictions seem to exist, preventing the bilateral trade from
reaching its potential. Thus, activities geared toward reducing existing bilateral trade barriers are
likely to produce positive results. It is recommended that the policy package needs to look at not
only formal trade policy variables but also domestic “behind-the-border” business environment
and “between-the-border” factors, such as trade facilitation infrastructure (Broadman, 2007).
Finally, it helps both China and particularly COMESA to weigh the benefits and costs of
the bilateral trade in terms of their overall development strategies. This paper estimates—
conditional on the model used—the unrealized trade potential to be high. It is thus anticipated that
any effects on economic development will deepen as the bilateral trade continues to expand in the
future.
It is worth noting that estimation of trade potential in the gravity model setup can be done
either at the aggregate or sectoral level. The results presented here are drawn from aggregated
exports and imports. It is possible that within the aggregates, trade in particular products may be
in line with the expected level (Brenton & Di Mauro, 1998). Future work may thus obtain richer
policy implications from further disaggregation of data.
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Appendix
Table A1. List of Countries in Gravity Model Regression
Developed Countries

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea, Republic of
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Developing Countries

Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States

Argentina
Brazil
Chile
China
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Malaysia
Mexico
Morocco
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Uruguay
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